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Book Review 
Slouching Toward Bethlehem with the 
Ninth Amendment 
Decision According to Law. By Charles L. Black, Jr. New York: 
W. W. Norton & Co., Inc, 1981. Pp. 83. $12.95. 
William Van Alstynet 
When Charles Black writes, he writes with the certitude and righteous-
ness of an Old Testament prophet. In Decision According to Law, 1 he has 
done so again. Taking as his text the Ninth Amendment, he seeks a new 
way to legitimate the ancient tendency of judges to overrun their office 
with good deeds. And he reconciles this legitimation of judicial activism 
with the spirit of democracy by the observation that it necessarily is done 
with the affirmative approval of Congress. 
I 
The scripture is superb for the task. Indeed, it is far superior to those 
texts deployed in the past. Very early, judges finding consitutional fault 
with enacted legislation were captivated by the following provision in Ar-
ticle I, Section 10, of the Constitution: "[N]o state shall ... pass any ... 
Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts."2 Literally hundreds of state 
laws were invalidated under the proscription of this clause before it suc-
cumbed to exhaustion. 3 
The judiciary eventually became disenchanted with the overuse of the 
contracts clause, and a period of relative passivity ensued. But judicial 
t Professor of Law, Duke University. 
1. C. BLACK, DECISION ACCORDING TO LAW {1981) (hereinafter cited by page number only). 
2. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10. 
3. The history of the contract clause is reviewed comprehensively in three lengthy articles by 
Hale, The Supreme Court and the Contract Clause {pts. 1-3), 57 HARV. L. REV. 512, 621, 852 
(1944). As succinctly and recently summarized by Justice Stewart: "Although it was perhaps the 
strongest single constitutional check on state legislation during our early years as a Nation, the Con-
tract Clause receded into comparative desuetude with the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment 
.... " Allied Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus, 438 U.S. 234, 241 {1978). 
207 
The Yale Law Journal Vol. 91: 207, 1981 
aggressiveness soon resumed, as activist courts seized upon the more 
promising (because more promisingly open-ended) due process clause:4 
"No State shall ... deprive any person of life, liberty, or property with-
out due process of law."5 Temporarily worn out after three decades of 
extremely heavy use, the same clause returned triumphant as a leading 
instrument of judicial activism in the 1960's.6 In the meantime, however, 
shifting clauses as others might shift gears, an activist judiciary trans-
ferred allegiance to the marvelous device of the imagined equal protection 
component of the Fifth Amendment and the explicit equal protection 
clause in the Fourteenth Amendment: "[N]or shall any State . . . deny to 
any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.m 
But even the fascination with the equal protection clause, with its in-
creasingly baroque overlays (two-tier review,8 three-tier review/ sliding 
scales of review10), is fast approaching exhaustion. Its overuse, as with any 
4. See, e.g., Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (state Jaw setting maximum hours of 
employment for bakers violated due process clause); Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578 (1897) (Lou-
isiana statute prohibiting contracting in state for marine insurance on Louisiana property with com-
pany not licensed to do business in Louisiana violated due process clause because it infringed upon 
liberty to contract for insurance). 
5. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. The Fifth Amendment contains a counterpart to this clause, 
prohibiting the federal government from depriving any person "of life, liberty, or property, without 
due process of Jaw." U.S. CONST. amend. V. For examples of the Court's free-wheeling reliance on 
the due process clause, see Morehead v. New York ex rei. Tipaldo, 298 U.S. 587 (1936) (striking 
down New York minimum wage law for women); Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312 (1921) (striking 
down state law restricting the use of injunctions in labor disputes); Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1 
(1915) (striking down state law prohibiting contracts requiring workers to refrain from joining union 
as condition of employment). 
6. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973) (right to privacy, encompassing woman's 
decision whether to terminate her pregnancy, is personal liberty protected by due process clause); 
Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (freedom to marry a person of another race is liberty with 
which state cannot interfere); Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 125 (1958) (right to travel is liberty 
protected by due process clause). 
7. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. The Supreme Court discovered an equal protection component 
embedded in the Fifth Amendment's due process clause in Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 500 
(1954), in which the Court held that segregation in District of Columbia public schools deprived black 
children of due process of law. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 93 (1976) ("Equal protection 
analysis in the Fifth Amendment area is the same as that under the Fourteenth Amendment".) 
8. The Court summarized the basic framework of two-tier review in San Antonio Independent 
School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 17 (1973): 
We must decide, first, whether [state legislation) operates to the disadvantage of some suspect 
class or impinges upon a fundamental right explicitly or implicitly protected by the Constitu-
tion, thereby requiring strict judicial scrutiny .... If not, the (legislative) scheme must still be 
examined to determine whether it rationally furthers some legitimate, articulated state purpose 
and therefore does not constitute an invidious discrimination . . .. 
9. In Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976), the Court announced an intermediate standard of 
review for constitutional challenges to gender classifications: "To withstand constitutional challenge, 
. . . classifications by gender must serve important governmental objectives and must be substantially 
related to achievement of those objectives." ' 
10. Justice Marshall has argued that the two-tier and three-tier models do not accurately describe 
the inquiry the Court has undertaken or should undertake in equal protection cases. Instead, he 
suggests that the Court has determined and should continue to determine the appropriate standard of 
review in light of "the character of the classification in question, the relative importance to individuals 
in the class discriminated against of the governmental benefits that they do not receive, and the state 
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scarce resource, dooms it to extinction. As new and convoluted categories 
of fundamental rights and suspect classes11 are added to the repertoire of 
equal protection law, the device becomes discredited. Severe criticism sets 
in, presaging a stopping point at which egalitarian efforts to reconstruct 
the Constitution will end. 
It is time, then, to shift gears again. Preposterously overlooked, the 
Ninth Amendment is at hand. Hemmed in by no explicit restrictions, 
moreover, it well could serve as an indefinite and perpetual basis for the 
legitimation of judicial activism. 12 The Ninth Amendment handsomely an-
swers the call to provide both a superior explanation for many previously 
doubtful decisions and a rationale for decisions still to be made: "The 
enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed 
to deny or disparage others retained by the people."13 
The Ninth Amendment originally was rescued from obscurity by Jus-
tice Goldberg's concurrence in Griswold v. Connecticut. 14 There it served 
the limitable purpose of informing the interpretation of principles enu-
merated in other amendments. The scope of the Ninth Amendment subse-
quently was developed more amply in academic suggestions. 15 Professor 
Black now proposes that the Ninth Amendment be newly centered as the 
best, if not the only, solid source of LAW for use in organizing a legal 
order of human rights. He believes that "[w]e need the Ninth Amend-
ment, for the sake of honesty and for the sake of utility."16 He embraces 
the amendment as an ambitiously useful judicial tool because it facilitates 
interests asserte~ in support of the classification." Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 
U.S. 307, 318 (1976) (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
11. The fundamental interests ingredient of the new equal protection was particularly open-
ended. It was the element which bore the closest resemblance to freewheeling substantive due 
process, for it circumscribed legislative choices in the name of newly articulated values that 
lacked clear support in constitutional text and history. The list of interests identified as funda-
mental by the Warren Court was in fact quite modest: voting, criminal appeals and the right 
of interstate travel were the prime examples. But in the extraordinary amount of commentary 
that followed, analysts searching for justifications for those enshrinements were understandably 
tempted to ponder analogous spheres that might similarly qualify. Welfare benefits, exclusion-
ary zoning, municipal services and school financing came to be the most inviting frontiers 
•••. Even with regard to suspect classifications, tantalizing statements from the Warren 
Court beckoned the searchers into the inner circle of strict scrutiny. 
Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Tenn-Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Chang-
ing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 8-10 {1972). 
12. Perhaps, indeed, its very lack of limitation has been a source of inhibition to the judiciary. For 
most of the amendment's history, courts have regarded it either as largely precatory or, at best, as 
providing a textual apron around the balance of enumerated rights. 
13. U.S. CONST. amend. IX. 
14. 381 U.S. 479, 486-99 {1965) (Goldberg, J., concurring). Justice Goldberg recognized that the 
Ninth Amendment did not leave judges free "to decide cases in light of their personal and private 
notions." He believed that the Ninth Amendment must be interpreted in light of three sources: the 
traditions and collective conscience of the nation, emanations of specific constitutional guarantees, and 
the experience of free societies. ld. at 493. 
15. See J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 34-41 {1980). 
16. P. 44. 
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outcomes that otherwise could be achieved only by "fast-talking our way 
past road-blocks"17 thrown up by the less spacious phrases or by the 
cramping, specific history of other clauses that the Court has used instead. 
Professor Black's selected test case, sex discrimination, is highly instruc-
tive of the defects of Fourteenth Amendment analysis. Unfortunately, 
however, it is also instructive of the defects of Professor Black's own 
Ninth Amendment analysis. He correctly reminds us that courts have 
grounded advances in women's rights principally-and awkwardly-on 
the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and its 
(imagined) counterpart in the Fifth Amendment. Pointing specifically to 
Frontiero v. Richardson, 18 Professor Black notes that "[i]n the plurality 
opinion, sex . . . is labeled a 'suspect' classification. But this conclusion 
. . . is not attained by flight without instruments into the big sky of pro-
phetic judgment."19 
Professor Black surely is correct in finding the Supreme Court's gender 
cases very awkward fare for "race-like" treatment under the Fourteenth 
Amendment. The reasons, only some few of which are summarily listed 
here, are legion: 
1. Women, unlike blacks, were not the subject of any particular solici-
tude in the framing of the Fourteenth Amendment and thus cannot draw 
upon abolitionist predicates to free themselves from the ordinary "ration-
ality" standard of equal protection review.20 
2. To the contrary, the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment regarded 
gender so differently from race that states forbidding women to vote did 
not, on that account, even risk a reduction in congressional representa-
tion. 21 In this respect, voting laws limiting the ballot by sex were treated 
unlike laws limiting the ballot by race and exactly like voting laws limit-
ing the ballot by age or by criminal record. 22 
17. P. 49. 
18. 411 U.S. 677 (1973) (holding unconstitutional federal statute that provided that spouses of 
male members of armed services were to be treated differently from spouses of female members for 
purposes of obtaining military benefits}. 
19. Pp. 72-73. See Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 688 (1973). 
20. The rationality standard of equal protection review requires only that a classification be ra-
tionally related to a legitimate governmental objective. This test is "a relatively relaxed standard re-
flecting the Court's awareness that the drawing of lines that create distinctions is peculiarly a legisla-
tive task and an unavoidable one." Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 314 
(1976) (per curiam). 
21. The Fourteenth Amendment provides for a reduction in a state's basis of congressional repre-
sentation if that state denies or abridges the right to vote to any man, but not woman, who has 
reached voting age and who has not participated in a crime. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2. 
22. See Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24 (1974} (holding that, insofar as § 2 of Fourteenth 
Amendment precluded reduction in congressional representation of states that disenfranchised persons 
convicted of crimes, it necessarily implied that such basis of disqualification under no circumstances 
could be deemed a denial of equal protection under § 1}. For reasons expressed elsewhere (and re-
flected in Justice Marshall's dissenting opinion, 418 U.S. at 72-77), I think the reasoning in Justice 
Rehnquist's majority opinion is unsound, despite its logical appearance. See Van Alstyne, The Four-
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3. So far removed was the early women's rights movement from 
imagining that the equal protection clause would provide them with any 
special protection that the earliest post-Fourteenth Amendment women's 
rights cases did not even attempt to rely on a claimed denial of equal 
protection. 23 
4. Neither can the claim of special protection rest comfortably on the 
Carolene Products"-4 footnote recognition of "discrete and insular minori-
ties.ms Constituting 51% of the population, fully enfranchised since 
1920,26 and scattered uniformly by birth (and evenly with males) among 
rich families as well as among middle-income and poor families, women 
simply cannot be compared with or analogized to blacks under the 
Carolene Products standard. 
5. If other constitutional clauses are useful in efforts to discern the 
proper content of a particular clause, 27 such clauses in this instance con-
tribute to the conclusion that gender-based classifications do not warrant 
an extraordinary standard of judicial review. As just noted, Section 2 of 
the Fourteenth Amendment itself treats sex as a legitimate classifying trait 
for the important privilege of voting. And insofar as the Nineteenth 
Amendment may be read to yield any inference at all with respect to the 
correct equal protection standard for gender-based classifications, it read-
ily may imply that when Congress proposed, and the states ratified, a 
limited sex-related amendment confined only to voting, they intended to 
leave absolutely unaffected the remaining mass of state statutes and com-
mon law treating men differently from women. 
On grounds of text, numbers, economic situation, and statutory and 
constitutional history, therefore, the Court indeed has been obliged to 
struggle to place gender-based cases into a near-race-equivalent category 
of "special" solicitude under the equal protection clause. Indeed, one pow-
erful argument for the dying Equal Rights Amendment28 is that it un-
teenth Amendment, The "Right" to Vote, and the Understanding of the Thirty-Ninth Congress, 1965 
SUP. CT. REV. 33, 38-68. 
23. See, e.g., Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 162 (1875) (unsuccessfully attempting to 
compel state to extend right to vote to women); Bradwell v. State, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130 (1873) 
(unsuccessfully challenging state's right to exclude women from practice of law). 
24. United States v. Carolene Prod. Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938). 
25. Id. at 152 n.4: 
Nor need we enquire ... whether prejudice against discrete and insular minorities may be a 
special condition, which tends seriously to curtail the operation of those political processes 
ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities, and which may call for a correspondingly 
more searching judicial inquiry [of the constitutionality of legislation challenged under the 
equal protection clause]. 
26. U.S. CONST. amend. XIX. 
27. Professor Black has been among the most effective in illustrating this technique. See C. 
BLACK, STRUCTURE AND RELATIONSHIP IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1969). 
28. Proposed U.S. CONST. amend. XXVII, § I of which reads: "Equality of rights under the law 
shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of sex." 
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questionably would provide a proper, desirable, and sound constitutional 
foundation for what the Court currently attempts to do so poorly under 
the equal protection clause. 29 
All of the above goes to show why there is much truth packed into 
Professor Black's dissatisfaction with the career of gender cases rational-
ized according to the LAW of the equal protection clause. The point of 
his prologue, however, is not so much to bury the Fourteenth Amendment 
as to praise the Ninth. 
If we feel uneasy with the Court's "flight without instruments . . .,"30 
and its rationalizations of its way through the maze of Fourteenth 
Amendment sex cases, Professor Black assures us that the Ninth Amend-
ment provides a sound rationale for judicial decision. Apparently without 
a shred of historical evidence31 or other support, Professor Black concludes 
that all of the awkwardly reasoned Fourteenth Amendment women's 
rights decisions can be "translate[d] into a conclusion that a broad bar on 
discrimination against women is a sustainable Ninth Amendment provi-
sion."32 Equal rights for women, we are told, is one of the "other rights" 
mentioned in the Ninth Amendment. 33 This view of the matter is far su-
perior, moreover, not just because it plainly frees judges to do the "right" 
thing, but because, in this fashion, 
we do not have to refer this question to mystical ideas about Western 
civilization (whose history rarely gives unequivocal support to any 
very good result, and certainly does not do so in this matter) or about 
the English-speaking peoples (of whom, in this connection, the less 
said the better). 34 
You may canvass Professor Black's book to find a convincing demon-
stration that the Ninth Amendment can thus be soundly read; I was flatly 
29. For a somewhat more elaborate statement on this point, see Van Alstyne, The Proposed 
Twenty-Seventh Amendment: A Brief, Supportive Comment, 1979 WASH. U.L.Q. 161, reprinted 
(with minor revisions) in ACADEME (Bull. A.A.U. Professors) Dec. 1979, at 477. 
30. P. 73. 
31. To the contrary, the colonial and post-constitutional legal history is overwhelmingly to the 
opposite effect. For example, in 1873 Justice Bradley wrote: "Man is, or should be, woman's protec-
tor and defender . . . . The paramount destiny and mission of woman are to fulfil the noble and 
benign offices of wife and mother. This is the law of the Creator." Bradwell v. State, 83 U.S. (16 
Wall.} 130, 141 (1873) (upholding state's authority to prohibit law practice by women) (concurring 
opinion). And, as recently as 1961, the Supreme Court upheld a law that included men on a jury list 
unless they requested an exemption, but exempted women unless they volunteered. Hoyt v. Florida, 
368 U.S. 57 (1961}. See L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1060-62 (1978} (early accept-
ance of prejudicial laws). 
32. P. 73. 
33. P. 75. 
34. Pp. 75-76. 
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unable to find one at all. He does not burrow through any materials about 
the Ninth Amendment in particular, for absolutely nothing is brought to 
bear in Professor Black's presentation from Madison's Notes or from any 
similar sources. Neither does he consult the pattern of laws at the time, 
the practices of English-speaking peoples in general, or even the "mystical 
ideas about western civilization." In the end, even an analysis based on an 
examination of practices of English-speaking peoples or of "mystical ideas 
about Western civilization" would be more compelling than the analysis 
offered to us by Professor Black. He does not attempt to support his posi-
tion, and his argument for incorporation into the Ninth Amendment of a 
right against sex discrimination in fact boils down to little more than 
wishful thinking. 
I have been frank to select this example of the supposed LAW of the 
Ninth Amendment for two reasons. First, it is Professor Black's chosen 
test case-he invites his audience to judge his thesis of the ignored superi-
ority of the Ninth Amendment for the adjudication of constitutional claims 
by the convincing quality of this example. I suggest that his reading audi-
ence accept that invitation and discern for itself where the example leads. 
Second, I have labored the example for its shock value to make very clear 
that the proposed transformation of the role of the Ninth Amend-
ment-from diffident and largely secondary uses to central and dominat-
ing ones-is a proposal of no small ambition. 
The original thought that among the "other rights retained by the peo-
ple" lies, in particular, a "broad ban on discrimination against women" is 
startling in the sense of its not being likely to have occurred to many. If 
such an implausible proposition actually can be made persuasive on no 
firmer a basis than I can find put forward in its behalf in this book, I do 
not doubt that virtually every desirable proposition similarly can be dis-
covered as already encompassed in the Ninth Amendment. Indeed, we 
then would have a more permanent basis for a more permanent flow of 
judicial activism35-one not embarrassed by precedent (of which there is 
very little), by language (which, in this instance, will sustain anything), or 
by history. The malleability of the Ninth Amendment might render the 
overuse of the contract, due process, and equal protection clauses trivial 
beyond compare. And this new-found constitutional springboard, which 
judges understandably have approached with circumspect caution and 
considerable diffidence, might give discretionary judicial activism its long-
est life ever. It is not just an invitation to be bolder, but a demand to be 
so-an appeal to duty to make more decisions according to this LAW of 
35. Professor Black has welcomed an association with this position in his highly regarded book, 
supra note 27, at 72 (describing himself as "a judicial activist proudly self-confessed"). 
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infinite capacity. 
II 
Moreover, there is elsewhere in this call to scriptural obligation a fairly 
thunderous rebuke of the timid whom Professor Black anticipates in their 
most obvious excuse. The anticipated excuse is that federal judges are life-
tenured, that the Ninth Amendment is notably uninstructive of its own 
content, and that an unseemly ambition in the possible application of this 
text is inappropriate for the least democratic institution of our national 
government. Professor Black's answer to this argument is that the federal 
courts, including the Supreme Court, decide what they decide because 
Congress wants them to do so. Again and again, Professor Black reminds 
us that federal courts act upon only so much of the body of cases within 
the judicial power of the United States as Congress manifests an affirma-
tive will that they decide. The popular will thus is executed, rather than 
throttled, by uninhibited use of the Constitution.36 
For three reasons, I very much wish that Professor Black had not cho-
sen this way to encourage a free-wheeling judicial approach to the serious 
business of constitutional review. First, it is not at all clear that he is 
correct. It is genuinely unsettled as to how far Congress may restrict the 
appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. Absolutely nothing in the 
book purports either to settle that uncertainty or even, for that matter, to 
acknowledge its existence. Second, eminently practical constraints make it 
substantially misleading for Professor Black to ground his theory on con-
gressional ability to restrict the Supreme Court's jurisdiction. Finally, it is 
my view that the part of the book most likely to be received and acted 
upon by Congress, to both Professor Black's and my own regret, is the 
suggestion that, what Congress permits the Court to do, it approves by 
permitting the Court to have done. The likelihood is not trivial that, given 
encouragement of this type, Congress routinely will use a weapon it has 
been generous enough to forbear from using for more than one hundred 
years: its power to reduce the role of the Supreme Court in American life. 
My own view is that Congress has been a friend of the nation in re-
fraining from using this power, but that once instructed that any such 
forbearance may be deemed a command to the courts to give ultra-activist 
renderings to provisions like the Ninth Amendment, Congress will feel 
summoned to its own "duty" to cut back substantially on what the Su-
preme Court safely may be allowed to decide at all. 
I need not recapitulate the debate over the scope of congressional power 
to restrict the Court's appellate jurisdiction. My own view is that this 
36. See, e.g., pp. 18-19, 26, 37-39. 
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congressional power may be very broad indeed. I do not subscribe to the 
view that cases involving certain "essential functions" cannot be with-
drawn from the adjudicative capacity of the Court. 37 So I do not disagree 
with Professor Black on this point/8 though among the diversity of pub-
lished opinion, there is a good deal to be said on the other side-and I 
wish it were correct. 
As a practical matter, however, it is quite unfair to infer that, because 
Congress does not withdraw whole categories of constitutional cases from 
the Supreme Court, it therefore has approved the Court's power, much 
less its particular uses of that power. For instance, it is reasonably well 
settled, as Henry Hart so usefully observed, that, if the Court is granted 
the power to decide a case at all, it must be allowed to decide the case 
constitutionally. 39 To have the Court review conflicting lower federal court 
interpretations (or conflicting state court interpretations) of an Act of 
Congress, but at the same time to forbid the Court also to adjudicate the 
substantive constitutionality of the Act as thus interpreted, may violate 
that precept. If the meaning, but not the constitutionality, of a federal 
statute is open to judicial determination, the necessary consequence might 
be to involve the judiciary itself in an affirmative violation of the Constitu-
tion by producing a decision, for example, that affirms a criminal convic-
tion although the Act as interpreted and as applied quite manifestly vio-
lates the constitutional rights of the convicted person. 
If Congress cannot so restrict the judicial power, then it is not true that 
Congress' failure to limit the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction nec-
essarily expresses approval of how that Court has interpreted the Consti-
tution; rather, it is an acquiescence of sheer necessity on Congress' part. 
To avoid the absurdity of having an Act of Congress produce unreview-
able, nonuniform interpretations in lower federal courts or among state 
courts, Congress must provide for unifying review in the Supreme Court. 
If, as is widely agreed, it cannot prevent that Court from also examining 
any manifest constitutional flaw in the Act, then it is not correct to say 
that Congress is approving constitutional review by the Supreme Court 
merely by its practical helplessness to avoid it. Much less, of course, is it 
approving whatever radical theories of constitutional construction may be 
held from time to time by any plurality of the Court's members. 
But at least as important as this last matter is Professor Black's and my 
mutual interest in avoiding the erection of self-destructive arguments in 
37. "Essential functions" are generally catalogued as cases involving either (a) the meaning of a 
federal statute or treaty, or (b) the substantive constitutionality of state or federal action. 
38. Sec Van Alstyne, A Critical Guide to Ex Parte McCardle, 15 ARIZ. L. REV. 229 (1973). 
39. Sec Hart, The Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction of Federal Courts: An Exercise in 
Dialectic, 66 HARV. L. REV. 1362, 1373, 1402 (1953). 
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the first place. The principal political threat to the Supreme Court's con-
stitutional functions today does not lie in an attempt to forestall judicial 
review of Acts of Congress; rather, it arises from widespread dissatisfac-
tion with the Supreme Court's review of state laws. Here, Congress well 
might remove whole categories from the Supreme Court's appellate juris-
diction with little of the embarrassment and few of the practical problems 
that would accompany limitation of jurisdiction over Acts of Congress. 
Very little, perhaps, may constrain Congress from acting to limit federal 
jurisdiction in this manner, save its own sense of discretion and of institu-
tional regard for the Supreme Court. A thesis urging the Court to do its 
own vision of good by reading the Ninth Amendment for every possible 
creative, activist construction, and to do so, moreover, on the theory th3:t, 
until Congress says otherwise, the Court should feel virtually commanded 
(or at least encouraged) by Congress to do so, is utterly self-destructive. 
This thesis puts the onus on Congress if Congress fails to limit the 
Court's jurisdiction, and life in Congress for those now resisting efforts to 
pare down constitutional review of state legislation is hard enough al-
ready.40 Professor Black's "support" is not, I think, especially welcome. 
Essentially, then, I find the demonstration of the superiority of the 
Ninth Amendment as a LAW of decision both unconvincing and largely 
unwelcome. The leading example chosen as a test case for mounting 
simpler, more clearly correct decisions is very unpersuasive. Rather, what 
is featured here is a new agenda for additional, ungrounded judicial activ-
ism that is even less encumbered than the current-and often 
strained-excessive efforts to do good. Finally, insofar as Professor Black's 
theory makes Congress responsible for what the Court decides, his thesis 
is partly misleading and otherwise unfortunate. 
40. Even now, Congress actively is considering S. 481, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 1259 (1981) ("[a] 
Bill to restore the right of voluntary prayer in public schools and to promote the separation of pow· 
ers"), which would strip all federal courts, including the Supreme Court, of 
jurisdiction to review, by appeal; writ of certiorari, or otherwise, any case arising out of any 
State statute, ordinance, rule, regulation, or any part thereof, or arising out of any act inter-
preting, applying, or enforcing a State statute, ordinance, rule, or regulation, which relates to 
voluntary prayers in public schools and public buildings. 
ld. at 1364. 
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